What if the Jazz kept Moses Malone?

In case you don't recognize him, this is 19-year-old Moses Malone playing his rookie season with the ABA's Utah Stars in 1974-75. Not only did the Hall of Famer spend one professional season in Utah, but he could have spent some time with the NBA team that eventually relocated to Utah. And so, since I haven't written about sports in far too long, I've decided to begin a series of "what ifs" in Jazz history. I went looking and couldn't find a satisfying list of Jazz what ifs. Most of them involved the Jazz winning specific games, but I don't think that's fair. Once the team is on the floor, there's nothing you can do. The best team usually always wins — especially in a best-of-7 series — and that's that. In my opinion, the most intriguing what ifs involve human decision from the front office that determines the roster of the team. What if they signed this guy? What if they drafted him? What if they didn't trade that guy? So, starting in chronological order, I will begin to examine the biggest what ifs in New Orleans/Utah Jazz history.

I have to credit Bill Simmons' The Book of Basketball for serving as my inspiration. He devoted one chapter to the 33 greatest what ifs in NBA history. (The awkward number comes from his devotion to Larry Bird.) No. 6 on his list was "What if New Orleans kept the rights to Moses Malone?" He explained the issue fairly well in two-and-a-half pages, and was plenty funny while doing it, too, but in my limited research, I've found he did skip a couple of important details, probably because they weren't funny enough. So let me try to give the story the justice it deserves, keeping in mind that all this happened long before I was born.

In 1974, Moses Malone was drafted in the third round of the ABA Draft by the Utah Stars, making the unprecedented leap from high school to the pros. Moses was an immediate success, averaging 18.8 points and 14.6 rebounds per game. Moses teamed up with Ron Boone, who was having the best season of his career (25 ppg and nearly 5 rpg and 5 apg), but the Stars went 38-46, replaced their coach Bucky Buckwalter with Tom Nissalke mid-season, and lost to Denver in six games in the first round of the playoffs. But even more disturbing was the financial state of the team. Utah's owner, Bill Daniels, was practically broke after a series of failed business ventures and an unsuccessful run for governor of Colorado. He tried to sell the team twice, but both times the new owners had to quickly give the team back because they couldn't afford the team. This kind of stuff just doesn't happen these days.

After 16 games into the 1975-76 season, the ABA finally shut down the Stars for not being able to pay its players. Moses and Boone were sold to the Spirits of St. Louis and Daniels was given 10% of that team, which also was going through financial difficulties and even wanted to relocate to Salt Lake. During this period of uncertainty, the New Orleans Jazz became curious about signing Moses. Now, the '70s were pure basketball chaos in terms of contracts and draft rights and the like, seeing as there were two professional associations that each had its own rules and methods. It wasn't uncommon for players to be drafted both by the NBA and ABA. So basically nobody knew what to do. But one thing was clear in 1975 — the ABA was struggling mightily.

Now this next part escaped Bill Simmons in his book, but I found the details in a Bangor Daily News article from Dec. 31, 1975. Apparently, Moses Malone's contract had a no-sell, no-trade clause, and since his contract was sold to St. Louis, he felt his ABA contract was in default. His attorneys contacted  NBA deputy commissioner Simon Gourdine, who approached commissioner Larry O'Brien, who decided to hold a special draft similar to the NFL's supplemental draft. According to the Bangor Daily News, this draft was specifically for ABA players who were not drafted by the NBA because they were underclassman, and were from college classes that hadn't yet graduated. This very specific status applied to exactly five players, including Moses Malone. Like the NFL supplemental draft, each team that participated in this draft would have to forfeit a future pick in the regular draft. New Orleans took Moses in the first round, surrendering its 1977 pick because it had already traded away its 1976 pick.

To understand why the Jazz didn't keep Moses, we're going to need to review a bit of the early Jazz history. The New Orleans Jazz were created in 1974 as the 18th team in the National Basketball Association. Their first move after the expansion draft was to acquire local legend Pete Maravich from the Atlanta Hawks. This was a no-brainer, but they paid a fairly steep price for him: Bob Kauffman, Dean Meminger, a 1974 first-round pick (which became former Ute Mike Sojourner), a 1975 first-round pick (David Thompson), a 1975 second-round pick (Bill Willoughby), a 1976 second-round pick (Alex English) and a 1980 third-round pick (Jonathan Moore). So to recap, that was two current players and five future draft picks all for the guy who averaged 44 ppg at LSU. I find this trade fascinating, so I'm going to put Moses on hold and break this down player by player.

Bob Kauffman was a six-year veteran when the Jazz acquired him in the expansion draft from the Buffalo Braves. While at Buffalo, Kauffman put up a 20-10 and made three All-Star games, but he must have gotten hurt in 1973, because his production dropped exponentially that season and he ended up retiring in 1975. So while it would have been nice for this new franchise to have had a veteran presence on the roster, he realistically wouldn't have produced much, so trading him was excusable.

Dean Meminger was a three-year pro, who was a bench player for the 1973 Knicks championship team. His peak was in 1974, when he averaged 8 points per game. But injuries quickly claimed his career, too, and he was out of the league by 1977. So no loss for the Jazz here, either.

The 1974 first-round pick was inexcusable in my opinion. New, young teams desperately depend on the draft to build their future, but owner Sam Battisone and president of basketball operations Bill Bertka really didn't know what they were doing and grossly underestimated the value of draft picks. Of course, this first pick didn't turn into anything special. The '74 pick ended up being No. 10, which the Hawks used to take Mike Sojourner from the University of Utah. He only played three years with Atlanta before retiring with averages of 8.7 ppg and 6.5 rpg. So had the Jazz kept the pick and taken Sojourner at No. 10, they wouldn't have gotten much. But the No. 11 guy was Hall of Famer Jamaal Wilkes, so they would've had that option available.

The 1975 first-rounder became the No. 1 overall pick. Atlanta used it on Hall of Famer David Thompson, who was by far the best player available. Thompson was also the No. 1 pick in the ABA, which he chose over the NBA, because he apparently was insulted by Atlanta trying to court him with a meal at McDonald's. He may have always wanted to go to the ABA anyway, because it was flashier and the "more exciting" league at the time, even though it was losing teams left and right. Anyway, there was nobody else in this draft who could have conceivably been drafted ahead of Thompson, but it is highly unlikely the mismanaged Jazz would have done a better job than Atlanta at persuading the  Skywalker to play in the NBA. Heck, the Jazz probably wouldn't have even been able to afford McDonald's.

With the 1975 second-round pick, Atlanta chose Bill Willoughby, who did play nine years in the NBA, but only averaged 6 ppg, so nothing too special there. The 1976 second-round pick, was pretty special, though. Atlanta traded it to Milwaukee, who used it to draft Hall of Famer Alex English. By the way, the Jazz didn't have their first-rounder in '76 thanks to a 1974 trade where they packaged the pick with three players for inept center Neal Walk. That '76 first-rounder became the 6th overall pick, which was used to take, you guessed it, another Hall of Famer — Adrian Dantley. But if the Jazz decided they didn't want him, they could have chosen the No. 8 pick, Hall of Fame center Robert Parish.

The 1980 third-round pick was wholly inconsequential, as Jonathan Moore never played in the NBA. Besides, the Jazz had already moved to Utah by that point. But what we see here is through two trades early in franchise history, the Jazz gave up the chance to draft four Hall of Famers (assuming they took two in '76). They gave away all that potential just to acquire two players: Pete Maravich and Neal Walk. Walk, by the way, averaged 9.9 ppg and 7.1 rpg in 37 games before the Jazz traded him for Henry Bibby, who averaged 8.9 ppg. So that Walk trade was nothing to write home about. But was the Maravich trade worth it?

There is no denying that Pistol Pete was pretty darn good. At the time of the trade, he was averaging 27.7 ppg, 5.2 apg and 4.9 rpg. He put up similar numbers in New Orleans, peaking in 1976-77 with a league-high 31.1 ppg. But he could never help the Jazz win more than 39 games in a season. And his hometown hero status combined with his flashy, entertaining style of play couldn't bring in enough fans to keep the franchise fiscally stable. But not all that was Maravich's fault. The Jazz's front office was unprepared to manage a professional basketball team. They first started playing games in the Loyola University Fieldhouse, which had a raised court that required a net around it to protect the players. They then moved to the Superdome, which is ridiculously too large for an average basketball game. The Jazz were also quite low on the Superdome's priority list, so they would often have to play long stretches of road games and were never sure they'd have a home court for a playoff game. (Luckily for them, that never became an issue.) The Jazz also did a very poor job of assembling a team around their local superstar. In their first season, the Jazz went through three different coaches and 22 players. Poor Pistol never had a chance to succeed.

Just for another fun quick tangent within my monstrously large tangent, here's some highlights from that original Jazz roster: Rick Adelman, who went on to have a much more memorable coaching career; 35-year-old Hall of Famer Walt Bellamy, who played exactly one game for the Jazz before retiring; Henry Bibby, more famous now for his son Mike; E.C. Coleman, who became the first Jazz player to make the All-Defensive 1st Team; BYU's Bernie Fryer, who only played two years in the league and averaged 6.3 ppg; and Utah State's Nate Williams, who actually was the team's second-leading scorer at 14.3 ppg. In other words, the team was Pete Maravich and 21 other guys. I understand the Jazz's overwhelming desire to bring in the local legend, and their lack of any valuable trade assets, but they really should not have thrown away their future like that. An expansion team's best friend is the draft, but the Jazz didn't realize that.

So now I think I've clearly demonstrated that this young NBA team had an incredible lack of foresight and was wholly incapable of producing a team that was successful financially and in the win column. This is all relevant in understanding why the Jazz didn't sign Moses Malone. To set the stage, let's go back to the end of the 1975-76 season.

The Jazz had improved to 38-44, probably thanks to some much-needed stability. They only had one coach, Butch van Breda Kolff, and they officially moved into the Superdome, saying goodbye once and for all to the net court. Pistol Pete only played 62 games, but he averaged 25.9 ppg and only had 12 different teammates, as it should be. Things were starting to look up, and with the impending ABA merger, the Jazz found themselves with the rights to one of that league's top talents — Moses Malone. But instead of signing him, the Jazz surrendered his rights to reacquire their previously forfeited 1977 first-round pick. Moses went back into the regular ABA dispersal draft and was picked by Portland, who immediately traded him to Buffalo, who quickly traded him to Houston.

This move flabbergasted Bill Simmons. In his book, he was quick to point out that van Breda Kolff was a drunk and probably thought Moses was an idiot. While Simmons' take was informative and humorous, he did overlook the biggest and most obvious reason for the Jazz passing on Moses — New Orleans couldn't afford him. Using today's logic, Moses would still have been under a cheap rookie contract. But it didn't work that way back then. Moses was already a star at age 20 and was making around $350,000 a year, which was quite a bit for the time. Especially for a brand new team that didn't even have its own arena. Unfortunately, Bill Simmons chose to be funny instead of accurate. But here is my proof: a Daytona Beach Morning Journal article from June 1976. The article quotes Jazz general counsel Sheldon Beychok as saying, "He's an expensive ball player and we're a poor franchise."

So there you have it. The Jazz couldn't afford Moses and he went on to have a Hall of Fame career with three MVPs and a championship with the 1983 Philadelphia 76ers. He also had his career rebounding game (37) against the New Orleans Jazz. A little bitter, perhaps? So what would have happened if the Jazz signed Moses Malone in 1976?

The most logical way this would have happened would have been for the Jazz to resist the Pete Maravich temptation. They would have had more money and an even worse roster, but an increased acceptance of young players. He would have been good, probably could have eventually won the MVP like he did in real life and all that, but that realistic version is boring. Let's create an ideal scenario where we get to have our cake and eat it, too. Let's pretend that the Jazz magically had enough money for Moses and Maravich (or were at least willing to take the financial risk).

Moses would have joined the team for the 1976-77 season, which was Maravich's finest — 31-5-5, 73 games at 41.7 minutes per game. The high amount of minutes was troubling, especially since Maravich had to retire in 1980. Maravich was really the only decent player on that team because only one other guy averaged 30 minutes a game — top defender E.C. Coleman at 30.8 mpg. So Moses coming in wouldn't step on anybody's toes. Let's pretend that he and Maravich were a match made in heaven, able to form the first, prehistoric Stockton-to-Malone tandem. Plus, Moses would be able to draw a lot of pressure off Maravich, so he wouldn't have to play so much and is able to extend his career a few more years.

Maravich and Malone would make the Jazz a winning team, but once they got to the playoffs, things would become awkward. The team would realize to late that the Superdome was already booked, so they'd have to back to the nasty net court that would drive away fans and thousands of dollars. Plus, the incompetent coaching of van Breda Kolff/Elgin Baylor would cost the Jazz a few key games and they wouldn't advance past the first round. Then the enormous salaries of Maravich and Malone would cripple the Jazz financially, and they'd have to relocate to Utah in 1979, where Moses would be reunited with all the old Utah Stars fans.

The first couple of years in Utah would be rough, but the Jazz would still be a competitive team and Moses would win a couple of MVPs (minus one because people would say he's only good because of Maravich). Tragically, the Maravich-Malone combo would never win a championship. They'd get close in 1983, but lose a heartbreaker in the Finals to the Boston Celtics. Maravich would retire after that (Moses could only extend his career so long). Naturally, the Jazz never would have acquired Adrian Dantley and Darrell Griffith, but in this ideal world, they would magically be able to draft John Stockton and Karl Malone.

Now, you might think that Moses Malone would have stifled Karl Malone's development. But listen to Charles Barkley talk about Moses some time. He always fondly points to him being his greatest mentor who turned him into a dominant power forward and one of the best rebounders of all time. So in this fantasy land, Moses and Karl work great together, and in 1987, when Moses had turned the keys to the offense over to Karl, the Jazz would finally break through and win an NBA championship.

And then, in 1990, the Jazz would acquire Jeff Malone, and with the power of three Malones (Moses, Karl and Jeff) Utah would win three more championships and establish a decade of dominance. Moses would retire in glory and Karl and John (and then Jeff Hornacek) would continue the tradition of winning until I got old enough to enjoy it.

Yes, that is exactly how it would have happened. If the Jazz would have signed Moses Malone, they would have laid the foundation for about six or seven championships (let's be realistic, Michael Jordan would've stolen a couple). But instead, the Jazz gave up Moses for a draft pick, which they packaged with several other draft picks to trade for the aged and injured Gail Goodrich. But that matter is for another what-if.